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THE IMMORALITY OF TEXTUALISM
Andrei Marmor*
Textualism is a doctrine of statutory interpretation. In fact, there
are two versions of textualism. One branch of textualism is simply a
negative view: it maintains that in statutory interpretation judges
should not strive to consult legislative intent or legislative history.
Let me call this view negative textualism, since it allows courts to
interpret legislation in countless ways, as long as their interpretation
does not purport to retrieve the actual intentions or purposes of the
legislature.' Negative textualism is not the kind of textualism I will
discuss in this essay. My concern here is positive textualism (often
referred to as "new textualism"). The latter encompasses negative
textualism, but also maintains that statutes and statutory regulations
should be interpreted, according to the ordinary meaning of the
language of the relevant statutory provision. Since the plain meaning
of statutory provisions is not always clear enough, textualism would
have judges rely on canons of statutory interpretation, as long as
those canons are clear bright-line rules that courts consistently
apply.2 Hereafter in this essay, "textualism" will refer to this
* Professor of Law & Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern
California. I am indebted to Elizabeth Garrett for her invaluable help with
drafts of this essay.
1. Jeremy Waldron, for example, defends such a view on the basis of an
account of the values associated with legislative procedures in democratic
assemblies. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 19-118 (1999).
Deference to legislative intent, Waldron argues, undermines the values and
political ideals that confer dignity and moral respectability on the process of
law making in democratic assemblies. Id. at 145. I have argued against
Waldron's version of textualism in ANDREI MARMOR, PosITIvE LAW AND
OBJECTIVE VALUES ch. 5 (2001).
2. Here is one of Justice Scalia's formulations of the official doctrine: "I
thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of
language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its
textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than
2063
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positive version of it.
Textualism in this positive sense is increasingly popular in
federal courts, and perhaps even more so, in certain neo-conservative
political-ideological circles in the United States. 3 This connection
between statutory interpretation and politics should not be surprising.
Views about statutory interpretation are partly views about the role
of judges in making law and their authority in determining what the
law is. To the extent that law matters to us-politically, morally, and
otherwise-it matters a great deal who gets to determine what the
law actually is. Textualists, like others, are rightly concerned about
the close connection between the how and who questions-how
judges determine what statutes mean significantly determines who
gets to make the law. The intuitive idea is this: the more discretion
or interpretative freedom judges have in statutory interpretation, the
greater their role, personally and institutionally, in determining what
the law is. And this is the upshot of textualism: textualists do not
want judges to make the law.
This, at least, is the official doctrine, and it sounds very
democratic. Lawmaking should be left to the legislature, textualists
maintain, because it is a political business, and as such, it should be
left to the elected representatives of the people. The judiciary is not
a democratic institution, and thus it should not be allowed to usurp
the power of making law by using various "liberal" or "creative"
means of statutory interpretation. 4 But there is also an unofficial
view, one that is more complex. In fact, one should suspect that
there is some hidden story here since it is not evident why distrust of
common law and the judiciary should be part of a neo-conservative
political agenda. On the contrary, at least from a historical
perspective, one might have expected that a distrust of judicial power
the ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a good reason for the
ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning." Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. I use the term "neo-conservative" in a rather loose fashion here, only to
indicate the contemporary dominant strand in American conservative ideology.
It is a difficult question, and one that I cannot answer here, how these new
conservatives, largely in control of the government these days, differ from their

traditional ancestors.
4. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in StatutoryInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 597-99 (1995)
(describing this rationale of textualism).
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should come from liberals and progressive political movements, not
from conservatives. After all, the judiciary is typically a rather
conservative institution, hardly ever at the forefront of social
radicalism. Why would conservatives like Justice Scalia, President
Bush, and countless other neo-conservatives find themselves aligned
with a rigid doctrine about separation of powers that originates in the
social radicalism of the French Revolution? What is the source of
deep distrust of the judiciary in the United
this neo-conservative
5
States?
I believe that the underlying motivation of textualism derives
from a neo-conservative conception of the regulatory state, much
more so, anyway, than from a concern with principles of democracy
and separation of powers. The upshot of this concern is the familiar
libertarian ideal of the "minimal" state and its deep distrust of the
"big government." 6 Essentially, the connection is this: textualism
urges judges to interpret statutes and statutory regulations as literally
as possible. Judges should apply the plain literal meaning of the
statute to the case at hand. But, of course, this is deceptive. Judges
typically need to interpret statutes-and cases get to higher courtsprecisely because the meaning of the relevant statutory provision is
not clear enough to yield a particular outcome (or, sometimes,
because the literal meaning entails results that are plainly unjust or
otherwise unacceptable). In other words, from the perspective of a
5. Is textualism just a reaction, albeit somewhat delayed, to the progressive liberalism of the Warren Court? Perhaps it is, but I doubt that this goes
deep enough. This shallow political explanation does not fully explain the
neo-conservative's particular focus on statutory interpretation. The legacy of
the liberal Warren Court, to the extent that it still exists, is mostly in the
constitutional domain, not in the field of statutory interpretation. Some
commentators have argued that textualism is a reaction to the Hart and Sacks
legal process theory, rather than a reaction to the Warren Court liberalism.
See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" Legal
Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1599 (1991). At an academic level, I
think that this is right. But it still doesn't quite capture the politics of
textualism and its conservative motivation.
6. This account of the motivation behind textualism is not entirely
unofficial: Frank Easterbrook made it quite explicit in Statutes 'Domain, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 549-50 (1983) ("Those who wrote and approved the
Constitution thought that most social relations would be governed by private
agreements, customs, and understandings, not resolved in the halls of
government.... A rule declaring statutes inapplicable unless they plainly
resolve or delegate the solution of the matter respects this position.").
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theory of interpretation, just telling judges that a statutory provision
means what it literally states is mostly quite unhelpful. Unless, that
is, one also assumes a default rule, whereby unresolved interpretative
issues ought to remain unresolved by judges. And this, I submit, is
precisely the unofficial story of textualism: that unregulated disputes
ought to remain unregulated, because regulation by the state, in any
legal form, is very suspect to begin with. In other words, I will argue
that textualists cannot be blind to the logical absurdity of their
interpretative position. They must know perfectly well that difficult
cases reach higher courts primarily because the language of the
relevant statute is not clear enough to resolve the issues at hand.
Their underlying political agenda, however, is to leave those
unregulated issues as they find them. By advocating a theory of
statutory interpretation that is preoccupied with literal meaning, and
purportedly relies on bright-line rules or canons of statutory interpretation, textualism strives to effectuate a broader ideological agenda
that seeks to reduce the state and its regulatory functions to the
necessary minimum. The deep distrust of neo-conservatives is not
really a distrust of judges, it is a distrust of regulation and state
intervention.
I. ORDINARY MEANING & UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The effect of textualism is most clearly present in the familiar
types of cases where the literal meaning of a statutory regulation
would lead to unacceptable results. These cases typically raise the
problem of unintended consequences: the legislature enacts a statute
without realizing that under a certain set of circumstances, a literal or
straightforward application of the statute would lead to consequences
that were neither intended nor, typically, would make much sense. A
wonderful case in point is United States v. Marshall.7 According to a
law that sets mandatory punishment for various drug offenses, the
weight of the drugs sold, defined by the statute in terms of "a mixture8
or substance containing a detectable amount of the relevant drug,"
triggers the mandatory minimums. As it turns out however, sellers
distribute LSD on a particularly heavy carrier viz., typically sprayed
7. 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), superseded by statute, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 n.H (2000).
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)(v) (2000).
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over paper or gelatin. 9 The defendants in this case sold relatively
small amounts of LSD, but the weight of the mixture of LSD with its
carrier substance triggered the mandatory minimum sentence.10
Marshall, one of the defendants, sold fewer than 12,000 doses of
LSD, but the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison." As Judge
Posner pointed out, however, to receive a comparable sentence,
Marshall would have had to sell ten kilograms of heroin, more than a
million doses(!); or in the case of cocaine, he would have had to sell
fifty kilograms, or approximately 325,000 doses. 12 Judge Posner
rightly noted that this must have been an unintended consequence:
"Congress simply did not realize how LSD is sold."' 13 And then he
poses the relevant question here: "Well, what if anything can we
judges do about this mess?"' 14 The majority, headed by Judge
Easterbrook, provided the standard Textualist answer: nothing at all.
The meaning of "mixture of or substance containing a detectable
amount" clearly applies, Easterbrook held, to the drug with the
weight of its carrier, and not only to the pure drug.' 5 To be sure,
Judge Easterbrook did not deny that the legal consequence here is
somewhat absurd; he simply did not think that it was his judicial
responsibility to rectify it. 16 Indeed, this is what the debate is about:
should judges clear up the mess created by poor legislative drafting?
Textualists reply that they should not.17
9. Marshall,908 F.2d at 1315.
10. Id. In fact, the weight issue is even more absurd: the weight of the pure
LSD is so light compared to the carrier that most of the weight for sentencing
is the weight of the carrier, and the choice of the carrier is pretty much
arbitrary. So, the weight is completely arbitrary, as it depends almost entirely
on whether the LSD was distributed on sugar cane, or gelatin, or blotter paper.
See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 458 n.2.
11. Marshall,908 F.2d at 1314.
12. Id. at 1334 (Posner, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1333 (Posner, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 1334 (Posner, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 1317.
16. See id. at 1318, 1324-26. The Supreme Court agreed. See Chapman v.
Untied States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-63 (1991).
17. There is a widespread debate about textualism's willingness, or
unwillingness, to correct a scrivener's error. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2420, 2459 n.265 (2003). I will
not deal with this particular debate here. To the extent that textualism is committed to ignore even such technical errors, my arguments in the text would be
more forceful, and to the extent that textualism allows for an exception with
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The argument supporting this stance has both a backward
looking and a forward looking aspect. Textualism seems to maintain
that if the legislature is unhappy with the particular judicial result, it
can always rectify the situation by legislative amendments that may,
if the legislature deems necessary, apply retroactively. 18 As to the
forward looking argument, textualism advocates a kind of educational policy: the more the courts consistently apply textualism, the
more legislators will realize that courts will not correct drafting
errors, and thus lawmakers will become more vigilant and meticulous when drafting legislation.19
Both of these arguments raise several difficulties. The backward
looking argument is particularly weak. First, it assumes that the
legislature can find the time, resources, and political will to monitor
and, if necessary, rectify judicial decisions whenever courts apply
such unintended consequences. This is both unrealistic and morally
questionable. It is unrealistic because legislative resources are very
limited. Given the number of courts and the vast number of judicial
decisions, it is naive at best, if not deliberately deceptive, to assume
that the legislature can correct every unintended consequence of a
legislative act. Even when the information becomes available and
the problem salient (which is not often the case), the legislature may
lack the political will to interfere in judicial decisions and make the
necessary amendments,
especially if it requires retroactive
20
application.
More importantly, however, the textualist position is morally
problematic. Litigation is not a theoretical exercise; there are
particular parties to the dispute whose fates are at stake. Consider
the case of Mr. Marshall. He ended up in prison at least a decade
longer than he should have. The court effectively told him that if the
legislature so wishes, it can amend the law retroactively and set it
respect to a scrivener's error, its consistency may be in some doubt. See, e.g.,
Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive Regime Change, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1971
(2005).
18. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 597-99.
19. Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34
TULSA L.J. 679, 685-86 (1999); Schacter, supra note 4, at 644-45.
20. In fact, the problem is even more troubling since there are some legal
constraints on the ability of Congress to rectify such problems retroactively,
some of them imposed by the court itself! See, e.g., Landgraf v. Usi Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264-66 (1994).
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right for him. It is difficult to see how this can be morally justified.
Nobody claimed that Marshall actually deserved this harsh sentence.
Does it make moral sense to put the responsibility on the United
States Congress to solve this by an act of retroactive legislation?
That hardly seems fair.
But the main moral concern here is not faimess-it is the
concern of using people only as a means to an end. A textualist
strategy that puts the responsibility on the legislature to eliminate
inequities resulting from poor legislative drafting actually amounts to
using the particular litigants only as a means to an end, without due
respect for their personhood and moral agency. It is a blunt violation
treat another
of the famous Kantian principle that one should never
21
itself.
in
end
an
as
also
but
person as a means only,
I am not trying to suggest here that the Kantian principle is
unproblematic or that its application is always as clear as we could
have wished. But, at least at its core, it is one of the basic principles
of humanist morality, and there are many clear cases of immorality
in its violation. Consider, for example, the case of a nanny who
deliberately neglects to feed the child in her care, in order to make a
point to her employers that next time they should leave her with
instructions about the food that the child likes. Surely, we would
say, there must be other means for the nanny to make her point
without using the suffering of the child as a means to an end. And,
crucially, this remains the case even if the parents have neglected
their own responsibility in leaving clear instructions for the nanny.
Similarly, in the case of Marshall and his codefendants, they were
used as a means to a political end, without respecting their
personhood-that is, without respecting the principle that they ought
to be punished according to the severity of their deeds.
And this brings us to the second issue: the forward looking
argument. Some commentators have focused on the empirical
aspects of this argument, claiming that textualism's working
assumption-that Congress can be induced to be more meticulous in
its legislative drafting-is problematic, at best, and most likely,
unrealistic. 22 But even if we assume that these commentators are
21.

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

38 (Mary Gregor ed., 1998) (1785).
22. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 19, at 688 nn.41-42 (1999); Schacter,
supra note 4, at 644, 645 n.280.
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wrong, and textualism's educational project is empirically feasible,
difficult moral-political questions remain.
First, there is a moral question about the role of the courts here:
Why should it be the business of the courts to educate the legislature
on how to draft statutes and enact laws? Is it because nobody else is
there to do it? Surely that is false. Countless interest groups, watchdogs, lobbyists, the general press, and eventually, the public at large
scrutinize legislators during campaigns and elections. Ample institutions are out there to tell the legislature how to do its job and how
to improve it. I am not suggesting that all these institutions have an
interest in particularly clear and unambiguous legislative drafting.
But surely, clarity is only one of the virtues of good legislation.
Legislation often has to reach a compromise between conflicting
considerations, and then other institutions, like agencies and courts,
should fill in the gaps. In any case, it is surely false to assume that
the courts are the only institution that scrutinizes legislative drafting.
Many other institutions fulfill a similar function, and they all have an
important advantage over the courts: they do not need to sacrifice
the interest of individuals in order to make their point.
Note that this question about the courts' role in educating the
legislature is even more pressing when considered on textualism's
own political grounds. If textualists are so concerned about respect
for democratic procedures, it must be because they attach a high
value to the respect we owe to the authority of legislative institutions.
But one does not normally express respect for the authority of
another by trying to educate the latter. In this respect, textualism
displays a certain arrogance towards the legislature that is not easy to
reconcile with
its alleged respect for the authority of democratic
23
institutions.
Secondly, and more importantly, this educational project is at
odds with the duty that courts owe to the legislature and thus,
indirectly, to all of us. Courts have the precious task of applying the
law and determining authoritatively what the law is in particular
cases. In fulfilling this role, courts must assume a fiduciary duty to
carry it out in good faith and to the best of their judgment. Consider
23. And this is particularly the case if the legislature's institutional ability
to live up to the textualist ideal is very limited. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 381-90 (3d ed. 2001).
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this analogy with employment relations: an employer entrusts the
employee with certain tasks. Of course, a good employer will give
instructions and try to make it as clear as desirable under the
circumstances what the employer expects the employee to do. But
both parties know, as they should, that there is a limit to the detail
and accuracy of such instructions. The expectation is that when the
employee lacks explicit directions, he should use his own judgment
and act in good faith to fulfill his tasks.24 In short, we do not expect
the employee to act like a textualist. Imagine yourself having to
work with a textualist employee who is constantly pressuring you to
give him the clearest instructions; and, when the instructions are not
clear enough, he does nothing at all in order to induce you to be more
precise in the future. My guess is that you would fire him.
Textualist employees tend to lose their jobs very quickly, and rightly
so, because they breach the duties that form an essential part of any
employment relationship.
Textualists are bound to object that the courts do not work for
the legislature. That is partly true, but not entirely. In a moral,
political sense, to some extent courts do work for the legislature, and
thus indirectly, for all of us. In the context of statutory interpretation, the courts are entrusted with an important task: to carry out
the "instructions" of the legislature in applying the law to particular
cases. Though not, of course, a straightforward employment relationship, such a task does carry with it a similar fiduciary-like duty
to act in good faith and fulfill the responsibilities according to the
agent's best judgment. In any case, I believe that the analogy holds
in this crucial respect: just as employers expect employees to know
that there is a limit to the instructions they can receive and, once on
their own, they must use their best judgment in fulfilling their
employment tasks, we must also expect the courts to know that there
is a limit to the legislative instructions they can get. At some point,
the courts must act like good employees when the instructions have
run out; they must use their own judgment and solve the problem as
best as they can.
To sum up, textualism's educational project, even if feasible, is
24. Note that the level of detail for such instructions typically depends on
the relative expertise and seniority of the employee; high level employees are

typically expected to act on their own without detailed instructions. After all,
that is what they are paid to do.
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morally unjustified. It should not be the business of the courts to
enlighten the legislature on how to make laws or how to make them
more precise. The moral obligation of the court is first and foremost
to do justice to the litigants in front of them, and, to the extent their
rulings have the force of binding precedent, the courts' duty is to
make the law the best it can be (given the conventional constraints of
the legal practice). Trying to teach the legislature how to make
legislation better should not be the business of the courts, especially
when it involves injustice to the litigating parties or when it entails
bad law.
II. ORDINARY MEANING AND THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE.

First year law students are taught that legal results often depend
on the meaning of words and sentences in a statute. If a statute
prescribes, to use a worn out example, that "No vehicles are allowed
in the public parks," then, students are told, the law depends on what
the word "vehicles" means: does it include, for instance, electric
wheelchairs, roller skates, bicycles, etc.? But how can we determine
whether the word "vehicle" means, among other things, bicycles or
electric wheelchairs? Is it really a question about the meaning of a
word in English? Textualists would have us believe that the answer
is basically yes, and that judges have only to verify what words or
linguistic expressions mean in the ordinary use of language. The
result of this attitude (strangely shared by non-textualist judges as
well) is that judges find themselves quarrelling over dictionary
definitions of words, running word checks in literature or,
sometimes, using sheer wit to convince us that their grasp of the
English language is correct and thus mandates the legal result they
seek. Allow me to demonstrate this using Justice Scalia's dissent in
Smith v. United States.25 In that case, the defendant exchanged a
firearm for drugs in a barter deal.26 Section 924(c)(1) mandates a
sentence enhancement for any defendant who "during and in relation
to any crime ...uses.., a firearm." 2 7 The majority held that section
924 applies, even if the defendant did not use the firearm as a
weapon. 28 Scalia noted:
25. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).

26. Id. at 225-26.
27. Id. at 227-28.
28. Id. at 228-37.
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In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical
words and phrases their ordinary meaning. To use an
instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose. When someone asks, "Do you use a cane?," he is
not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's sliverhandled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to
know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of
of using it for its distinctive
"using a firearm" is to speak
29
purpose, i.e., as a weapon.
A noble result, perhaps, but the argument is a non-sequitur. The
phrase "use an x" is ambiguous. To use an object can either mean
"use" in a narrow sense, namely, for its intended purpose, or it can
mean "use" in a broader sense, for whatever purpose context may
allow. Consider another example: if somebody asks me, "Are you
taking drugs?" the answer is both yes and no, depending on what you
mean by "drugs." Yes, I regularly take prescription medicine. But
no, I do not take illicit drugs such as marijuana or cocaine. This is a
typical form of ambiguity, whereby a word or phrase can either be
used in a narrow sense, or a broader one, depending on the context of
its expression. Whether one uses an ambiguous term in a narrow or
broad sense entirely depends on context. Consider Justice Scalia's
example: suppose A tells B that he "used a cane." Is it obvious that
A meant "use" in the narrow sense, such as using a cane for walking?
That just cannot be determined without the contextual background.
Consider the following conversation between A and B:
A: How did you break the window?
B: Iused a cane.
Now we know that B did not walk with a cane, he used it to break
the window; a perfectly sensible use of "use" (though perhaps not a
very sensible deed).
We cannot resolve ambiguities by dictionary definitions or by
any other means of verifying what words mean in a natural language.
Natural languages are abundant with ambiguous terms, and we
normally disambiguate particular utterances by relying on the
knowledge of the relevant context. The question of whether we
understand "using a firearm" in the narrow sense (using it as a
weapon), or in the broader sense (using it for whatever crime related
29. Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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purpose), cannot be determined by a better grasp of what the word
"use" means in English. In English
it can mean either, depending on
30
the context of its expression.
Similar considerations apply to the problem of vagueness,
perhaps even more evidently so. Most concept words we use in a
natural language are vague. In the application of the word to
concrete instances, there are bound to be borderline cases. Can we
tell whether John, weighing 240 pounds is "obese"? Is John "tall" if
he is 6 feet? And is he "bald" if he has 200 strands of hair on his
head? The problem of borderline cases due to vagueness is that they
are inquiry resistant. No amount of further information can determine whether John is really bald, or tall, or obese, etc. 31 But what
if a legal decision depends on it? Judges should try to determine
why does it depend on the relevant factor, and then they should strive
to reach an adequate result on the merits of the case. An attempt to
figure out what "tall" or "bald" really means in ordinary English can
only reveal that these terms are vague and thus would necessarily
have borderline cases. If you happen to face a borderline case, no
further amount of knowledge of English can tell you how to classify
such a case.
One might be tempted to reply that in such cases judges should
rely on canons of statutory interpretation like, for example, espressio
unius (expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others),
noscitur a sociis (terms in a series should be interpreted according to
the surrounding terms) and such. But the assumption that application
30. In fairness to Justice Scalia, I should mention that he proposed another
argument in his dissent that is much more sensible: he argued that if "using a
firearm" is ambiguous in this case, the rule of leniency in criminal law requires
courts to interpret the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Id. at 246-47
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

I am not suggesting that this is an appropriate

application of the rule of leniency, only that the argument is much better.
Notably, however, this line of reasoning undermines the first argument.

31. I should qualify this somewhat: According to one philosophical theory
about vagueness, borderline cases are inquiry resistant only in an epistemic
sense. See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS 3 (1994). Such philosophers

claim that there is a truth of the matter about borderline cases, even if those
truths are not knowable. See id. at 212-15. This so called epistemic theory of
vagueness, however, is very controversial, and in any case, hardly affects my
argument in the text. For all practical purposes, it remains true that borderline
cases are inquiry resistant, even if it is true that in some deep metaphysical
sense there is a truth of the matter about borderline cases. See id.
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of canons of interpretation would solve the problems left open by
linguistic indeterminacies is too naive to be taken seriously. Let me
state the obvious: First, canons of statutory interpretation are
formulated in a natural language (impressive Latin phraseology
notwithstanding), and thus all the indeterminacies of natural
language would plague them as well. Second, canons of statutory
interpretation often conflict-and the more such canons you employ,
the more likely it is that they will conflict. 32 One canon stipulates,
for example, that later statutory provisions ought to prevail over
earlier ones; and another canon dictates that specific provisions
ones. What are we to do if the later
should prevail over general
33
provision is more general?
But of course the problem goes deeper than this. Vagueness,
ambiguity, and other linguistic indeterminacies cannot be eliminated.
Consider vagueness, for example. In some cases, particular borderline cases can be legally resolved, as it were. The law could stipulate
that concept X, under circumstances C, would include (or exclude)
borderline cases a, b, and c. But then a, b, and c would have their
own borderline cases, so the vagueness of X would not be eliminated, or even reduced; it would only be shifted to other potential
cases. 34 It is true that in some limited areas, the law purports to have
a margin of safety, phasing out borderline cases as if they are "no"
cases. A good example is the rule of leniency in criminal law, which
basically prescribes that unless an action falls well within the
meaning of the offense, it should be regarded as if it does not. This
32. One recent casebook counted over 120 canons allegedly used by the
Supreme Court during the period of 1986-1993. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, &
GARRETr, supra note 23, app. B.
33. To be sure, I am not claiming that canons of statutory interpretation are
completely useless. They may be very useful in numerous contexts for various
specific purposes of statutory interpretation. My only claim in the text is that it
is mistaken to believe that such canons can generally solve the deep problems
that stem from the indeterminacy of language. There is nothing new about this
observation-it has been made dozens of times before. See, e.g., Symposium,
A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation,45 VAND. L. REv.
529 (1992).
34. Here is an example: Consider the "no vehicles in the park" rule. Suppose the legislature stipulates that for the purposes of this rule, "vehicle" will
not include (inter alia) "bicycles." So then the question might arise whether
"bicycles" includes, for example, tricycles, bicycles with a small electric
engine, etc.
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is a noble attempt to phase out borderline cases, but as a general
strategy, it cannot work. Even if the law employs a generous margin
of safety, we are still left with second-order 35
vagueness viz.,vagueness about where the borderline cases begin.
To be sure, I am not claiming that the meaning of legal rules
does not profoundly depend on the semantics of the relevant natural
language. Of course it does. We can only understand the law
because we understand the language. Furthermore, I have long
argued that there are necessarily "easy cases" in law, cases in which
there is no doubt that the law applies, or not, to the particular case at
hand simply because it is what the relevant linguistic expression
means. 3 6 Had Mr. Smith pointed the loaded gun to the face of the
drug dealer and demanded the drugs by threatening to shoot him,
there would have been no doubt that he "used a firearm" according to
section 924(c)(1). This would have been an "easy" case, precisely
because such a use of a gun is exactly what "using a firearm" means.
The point is, however, that such easy cases rarely get to be litigated,
especially in higher courts. Litigation typically reaches appellate
courts in "hard cases," where statutory language is indeterminate due
to ambiguity, vagueness, or other semantic or syntactic indeterminacies. 37 And then it would be absurd to say that in such cases the
law should depend on what words and sentences mean; there is
nothing one can further inquire about the meaning of such
expressions in English. Courts cannot resolve ambiguities, or
borderline cases due to vagueness, by a better grasp of natural
language. There is nothing more about language one can possibly
know that would resolve such cases on the basis of "ordinary
meaning," to use Justice Scalia's expression.
One might suspect that this is too obvious to have been
overlooked by textualists. This I am happy to concede. Textualism
35. On the idea that vagueness in law cannot be eliminated, see TIMOTHY
A.O.

ENDICOTr, VAGUENESS IN LAW

185-90 (2000); see also Andrei Marmor,

Should Like Cases be TreatedAlike?, in 11 LEGAL THEORY (2005), 37-48

36. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 2, 7 (2d

ed. 2005).
37. To be sure, I do not intend to claim here that all "hard cases" in
statutory interpretation necessarily derive from linguistic indeterminacies.
There are many possible reasons for the need to interpret statutory law, besides

those that derive from language. Conflict between different statutory provisions, or between them and other parts of the law, would be another example.
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is not a theory about the semantics of statutory language; as such it
would have been too obviously mistaken. The preoccupation with
"ordinary meaning" reflects a political stance, one which is mostly
concerned with the desirable limits of statutory regulation. The more
courts confine judicial interpretation of statutes to their "ordinary
meanings," (real or imagined) the more courts constrain the
legislature's ability to achieve broad regulatory policies. In any
complex organization, broad policy changes can only be accomplished if those who determine the policy and those who are
supposed to carry it out act in concert and share the spirit of the
general goals to be advanced. Imagine, for example, a large
corporation that strives to implement a new policy. It is difficult to
imagine how the corporation could implement the new policy if the
mid and low-level executives required very detailed instructions for
their every move, and then tried to follow those instructions to the
letter in a textualist fashion. Textualism is motivated precisely by
denying the legislature the spirit of cooperation that is necessary to
implement broad regulatory policies. 38 Vulgar semantics is just one
more casualty in this war against "big government."
III. CONCLUSION.

You may think that I have been unfair to textualism. After all,
there is nothing new about the phenomenon; courts have always
acted in an ideological fashion, often driven by ideological and
political commitments of the prevailing judiciary. Liberal courts
strove to advance a liberal political agenda, and now conservative
courts work to advance their own agenda in a different direction.
The fact that every judicial political agenda requires adjustments of
theories of statutory interpretation is hardly news.
I certainly agree with both of these observations. The problem
is that textualism is actually different from previous theories, in two
respects. First, as I have tried to argue here, textualism involves an
impoverished theory of interpretation, one which simply ignores the
38. I realize that there may be exceptions to this. Sometimes the
cooperation that the legislature needs is actually a literalist attitude. For
instance, if the legislature is forced to enact a very uncomfortable compromise,
it may actually rely on the courts to interpret the compromise as literally as
possible. See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 540. But these are exceptional
cases, and they do not undermine the general point.
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obvious complexities of language. Second, and more troubling from
a moral point of view, textualism differs from previous politicallydriven theories in its ideological opacity.
Admittedly, courts are often in a very delicate political situation.
Higher courts typically have more political power than people
assume. Courts determine what the law is, often prevailing over the
democratically-elected legislature. This disparity between actual
power and public perception has always put considerable pressure on
the courts to conceal some of the power they actually have, typically
by presenting judge-made law (that is often inevitable) as an act of
law application. This is understandable and not necessarily a bad
thing. The problem I see with textualism is that its theory of
statutory interpretation is ideologically opaque, not to say
straightforwardly deceptive. With very few exceptions, its adherents
present textualism as an interpretative practice that respects the
authority of legislatures, and that respects democracy and the
democratic division of labor between the courts and the legislature.
But, as I have tried to show here, textualism does the exact opposite.
The whole point of textualism is to undermine the ability of the
legislature to pursue broad regulatory goals. When you make a point
of strictly abiding by the letter of the directives, you actually behave
in an uncooperative fashion. Authorities do not want to be
understood literally. Authorities purport to govern, and complex,
large-scale governance requires cooperation in the spirit of its goals,
not a strict adherence to the letter of its directives.
But now you may wonder, why do we need this ideological
opacity at all? Why not make the ideological goal explicit,
especially now, when the executive branch and the majority of
Congress largely share this textualist ideology anyway? I venture to
guess that the answer resides in the following: one of the ironies of
neo-conservativism is that in the complex world we live in, it takes a
substantial amount of legal regulation to implement its antiregulatory ideology. This is true mostly because governance is no
longer the exclusive domain of a central administration that sits in
Washington and dictates to citizens across the country how to live.
Governance has long spread to low-level political institutions, local
authorities and bureaucracies, and grassroots organizations that often
utilize the courts and these entities generate a huge amount of legal
regulation. It is simply no longer the case (if it ever has been) that a
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libertarian government can avoid excessive regulation by abstention,
as it were. Libertarians find themselves in the uncomfortable
position whereby they need to use regulation by a central
government to curb39 the regulatory regime of local authorities and
numerous agencies.
If I am right about this, it would seem that textualism is bound to
fail on its own terms. But this is not necessarily the case. Nothing
prevents the courts from acting in a way that is theoretically
incoherent. Textualism is a tool, and it can be used selectively, only
when it serves an ideological purpose. But then, when you rely on
an incoherent theory, opacity is the price you have to pay for it; an
incoherent theory is difficult to make transparent. In other words,
neo-conservatives cannot easily proclaim that their theory of
statutory interpretation is simply designed to curb the regulatory
means of government because they know that they often need that
regulatory mechanism to curb regulation that originates elsewhere.
So I do not think that textualism is bound to fail. But on its own
ideological grounds, textualism is bound to be a flip-flop theory, one
that cannot be applied consistently across the board. Textualism is
thus inherently deceptive and consequently immoral.

39. Not to speak of the conservative agenda to dismantle the welfare state
that takes a lot of legislating.

